Abstract. In this paper a social agent model for joint decision making is presented addressing the role of mutually acknowledged empathic understanding in the decision making. The model is based on principles from recent neurological theories on mirror neurons, internal simulation, and emotion-related valuing. Emotion-related valuing of decision options and mutual contagion of intentions and emotions between agents are used as a basis for mutual empathic understanding and convergence of decisions and their associated emotions.
Introduction
An important aspect in group functioning is the ability for joint decision making. In recent years developments in neuroscience have clarified some of the mechanisms underlying such processes (e.g., [7, 13, 18] ). Two interrelated core concepts in this discipline are mirror neurons and internal simulation. Mirror neurons are neurons that not only have the function to prepare for a certain action or body change, but are also activated upon observing somebody else who is performing or tending to perform this action or body change (e.g., [23, 32, 35, 39] ). Internal simulation is mental processing that copies processes that may take place externally, for example, in another individual (e.g., [8, 10, 16, 17, 20] ). On the one hand, mirror neurons and internal simulation have been put forward as a basic mechanism for imitation and contagion of actions and emotions; on the other hand, they have been related to empathy; e.g., [23] . In this way mirror neurons and internal simulation provide a basis both to mutually tune individual intentions and emotions and to develop mutual empathic understanding between persons (e.g., [16, 17, 33, 36] ). Usually these two aspects are addressed separately, but in joint decision making processes they both play their roles in order to achieve solidly grounded joint decisions.
Empathic understanding can concern both cognitive (e.g., knowing or believing) and affective (e.g., feeling) aspects. Affective and cognitive understanding are often related to each other, as any cognitive state triggers an associated emotional response which is the basis of the related feeling (e.g., [8, 10, 11, 12] ). Usually in an individual decision making process, before a decision option is chosen an internal simulation takes place to predict the expected effects of the option (e.g., [2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 28] ). Based on these predicted effects a valuation of the option takes place, which may involve or even be mainly based on the affective state associated to this effect (e.g., [1, 8, 9, 11, 29, 31] ). To achieve a solid joint decision, a shared feeling and valuation for the chosen option are important, and also mutual recognition of this sharedness. When this is achieved, a common decision has a strong shared emotional grounding as the group members do not only intend to follow that option, but they also share a good feeling about it, and they have (mutually acknowledged) empathic understanding of how other persons feel about the options. The latter may be important as well for acceptance of non-joint decisions.
The obtained social agent model can be used as a basis for the design of human-like virtual agents for simulation-based training or in gaming, or for virtual stories. For the first type of application the idea is to develop a number of virtual agents cooperating with a human trainee as a team in an decision making task. For the second type of application the idea is to design a system for agent-based virtual stories in which, for example, persons play a role which can be based on the presented model.
In this paper, first in Section 2 some core concepts used are briefly reviewed. Next, in Section 3 the social agent model is presented. In Section 4 some of the explored simulation scenarios are discussed. Finally, Section 5 is a discussion.
Mirroring, Internal Simulation and Emotion-Related Valuing
Two concepts used here as a basis are mirror neurons and internal simulation; in combination they provide an individual's mental function of mirroring mental processes of another individual (see also [39] ). Mirror neurons are not only firing when a subject is preparing an action, but also when somebody else is performing or preparing this action and the subject just observes that. They have first been found in monkeys (cf. [15, 34] ), and after that it has been assumed that similar types of neurons also occur in humans, with empirical support, for example, in [25] based on fMRI, and [14, 30] based on single cell experiments with epilepsy patients (see also [23, 24, 27] ). The effect of activation of mirror neurons is context-dependent. A specific type of neurons has been suggested to be able to indicate such a context. They are assumed to indicate self-other distinction and exert control by allowing or suppressing action execution; e.g., [6, 19, 24] , and [23] , pp. 196-203.
Activation states of mirror neurons play an important role in mirroring mental processes of other persons by internal simulation. In [26] the following causal chain for generation of felt emotions is suggested (see also [12] , pp. 114-116): sensory representation  preparation for bodily changes  expressed bodily changes  emotion felt = based on sensory representation of (sensed) bodily changes As a further step as-if body loops were introduced bypassing actually expressed bodily changes (cf. [8] , pp. 155-158; see also [10] , pp. 79-80; [11, 12] ): sensory representation  preparation for bodily changes = emotional response  emotion felt = based on sensory representation of (simulated) bodily changes An as-if body loop describes an internal simulation of the bodily processes, without actually affecting the body, comparable to simulation in order to perform, for example, prediction, mindreading or imagination; e.g., [2] , [16] , [17] , [20] , [28] . The feelings generated in this way play an important role in valuing predicted or imagined effects of actions, in relation to amygdala activations; see, e.g., [29] , [31] . The emotional response and feeling mutually affect each other in a bidirectional manner: an as-if body loop usually has a cyclic form (see, for example, [11] , pp. 91-92; [12] , pp. 119-122): emotion felt = based on sensory representation of (simulated) bodily changes  preparation for bodily changes = emotional response As mirror neurons make that some specific sensory input (an observed action of another person) directly links to related preparation states, they combine well with as-if body loops; see also [39] , or [12] , pp. 102-104. In this way states of other persons lead to activation of some of a person's corresponding own states that at the same time play a role in the person's own feelings and decisions for actions. This provides an effective mechanism for how observed actions and feelings and own actions and feelings are tuned to each other. Thus a mechanism is obtained which explains how in a social context persons fundamentally affect each other's individual decisions and states, including feelings. Moreover, it is also the basis for empathic understanding of other persons' preferences and feelings. Both the tuning and convergence of action tendencies and the mutual empathic understanding (even when finally no common option is decided for) play a crucial role in joint decision making processes.
The Social Agent Model
The issues and perspectives briefly reviewed in the introduction and Section 2 have been used as a basis for the neurologically inspired cognitive agent model presented below (for an overview, see Fig. 1 ); in summary:

Decision making is based on emotion-related valuing of the predicted effects of each action option  Both the tendency to go for an action and the associated emotion are transferred between agents via mirroring processes using internal simulation  These mirroring processes at the same time induce a gradual process of mutually tuning the considered actions and their emotion-related valuations, and the development of mutual empathic understanding 
The outcome of such a joint decision process in principle involves three elements: o a common action option o a shared positive feeling and valuation for the effect of this action option o mutually acknowledged empathic understanding for both the action and feeling  In case of an outcome without a common choice for an action option, the process results in mutually acknowledged empathic understanding  The mutually acknowledged empathic understanding is based on the following criteria: (a) Showing the same state as the other agent (nonverbal part of the empathic response) (b) Telling that the other agent has this state (verbal part of the empathic response) Assuming true, faithful nonverbal and verbal expression, these criteria are in line with the criteria of empathy for affective states formulated in [36] .
In the model s denotes a stimulus, a an option for an action to be decided about, and e a world state which is an effect of the action. The effect state e is valued by associating a feeling state b to it, which is considered to be positive for the agent (e.g., in accordance with a goal). The state properties used in the model are summarised in Table 1 .
Fig. 1. Overview of the social agent model
The social agent model uses ownership states for actions a and their effects e, both for self and other agents, specified by OS(B, s, a, e) with B another agent or self, respectively (see Fig. 1 ). Similarly, ownership states are used for emotions indicated by body state b, both for self and other agents, specified by OS(B, e, b) with B another agent or self. As an example, the four arrows to OS(B, s, a, e) in Fig. 1 show that an ownership state OS(B, s, a, e) is affected by the preparation state PS(a) for the action a, the sensory representation SR(b) of the emotion-related value b for the predicted effect e, the sensory representation SR(s) of the stimulus s, and the sensory representation SR(B) of the agent B. Note that s, a, e, b, and B are parameters for stimuli, actions, effects, body states, and agents. In a given agent model multiple instances of each of them can occur. Prediction of effects of prepared actions is modelled using the connection from the preparation PS(a) of the action a to the sensory representation SR(e) of the effect e. Suppression of the sensory representation of a predicted effect (according to, e.g., [3] , [4], [28] Fig. 1 ) have weights, as indicated in Table 2 . 
SR(B, a), SR(s), PS(a), SR(e) OS(B, s, a, e) 41a, 42a, 43a, 44a In this table the column LP refers to the (temporally) Local Properties LP1 to LP9 presented below. A weight usually has a value between -1 and 1 and may depend on the specific instance for agent B, stimulus s, action a and/or effect state b involved. Note that in general weights are assumed non-negative, except for inhibiting connections, such as 22e which models suppression of the sensory representation of effect e, and 22b which models suppression of the sensory representation of body state b.
Below, the dynamics following the connections between the states in Fig. 1 are described in more detail. This is done for each state by a dynamic property specifying how the activation value for this state is updated based on the activation values of the states connected to it (the incoming arrows in Fig. 1 ). Note that in these property specifications s, a, e, b, and B are parameters for stimuli, actions, effects, body states, and agents, respectively; multiple instances for each of them can be used in a given agent model. The agent model has been computationally formalised using the hybrid modeling language LEADSTO; cf. [5] . Within LEADSTO a dynamic property or temporal causal relation a   b denotes that when a state property a (or conjunction thereof) occurs, then after a certain time delay, state property b will occur. Below, this delay will be taken as a uniform time step t. Each time first a semiformal description is given, and next a formal specification in the hybrid LEADSTO format. Parameter  indicates the speed by which an activation level is updated based on received input from other states. During processing, each state property has an activation level represented by a real number between 0 and 1; variables V (possibly with subscripts) run over these values. In dynamic property specifications, this is added as a last argument to the state property expressions (an alternative notation activation(p, V) with p a state property has not been used for the sake of notational simplicity).
Below, f is a function for which different choices can be made, for example, the identity function f(W) = W or a combination function based on a continuous logistic threshold function of the form
with  a steepness and  a threshold value, when X ≥ 0, and 0 when X < 0. Table 3 in Section 4.
The first property LP1 describes how sensory representations are generated for any state W, indicating a stimulus s, an action a of an agent B, or a feeling b of an agent B.
LP1 Sensory representation of w based on a sensor state for w
If the sensor state for W has level V1 and the sensory representation of W has level V2 then after duration t the sensory representation of W will have level V2
The sensory representation of an effect state e is not only affected by a corresponding sensor state for e (affected by the world state), but also by two action-related states:
 via the predictive loop by a preparation state, as a way of internal simulation to predict the effect e of a prepared action a  by an inhibiting connection from the self-ownership state, to suppress the sensory representation of the effect e of the action a, once it is going to be initiated; e.g., [3] , [4] This is expressed in dynamic property LP2. Note that for this suppressing effect the connection weight  22e from ownership state for action a to sensory representation for effect e is taken negative, for example  22e = -0.2. Dynamic property LP2b specifies a similar temporal relationship for update of the sensory representation of a body state, and thus models internal simulation by an as-if body loop.
LP2e Sensory representation for an effect state e
If the preparation state for action a has level V1 and the ownership of action a for B and s has level V2 and the sensor state for state e has level V3 and the sensory representation state of e has level V4 then after t the sensory representation of e will have level V4 The first bullet is an external trigger for the action. The second bullet models the impact of the result b of the emotion-related valuing of the action effect e. The third bullet models the mirroring effect for the action as observed as a tendency in another agent. Similarly for the preparation for a body state b; here the sensory representation of the effect e serves as a trigger, and the emotion state of another agent is mirrored.
LP3a Preparing for an action a
If sensory representation of s has level V1 and sensory representation of body state b has level V2 and sensory representation of B for a has level V3 and the preparation for action a has level V4 then after t preparation for action a will have level V4
LP3b Preparing for a body state b
If sensory representation of e has level V1 and sensory representation of b has level V2 and sensory representation of B for b has level V3 and the preparation for action a has level V4 then after t preparation for action a will have level V4
Ownership states for an action a or body state b are generated by LP4a and LP4b. They keep track of the agent's context with respect to the action or body state. This context concerns both the agent self and the other agents and their extent of ownership of the action or body change; in this sense it is a basis for attribution to an agent, and includes self-other distinction. Moreover, a self-ownership is used to control execution of prepared actions or body states, like super mirror neurons are assumed to do. For example, in case the agent B is self, the ownership state for action a strengthens the initiative to perform a as a self-generated action: executing a prepared action depends on whether a certain activation level of the ownership state for the agent self is available for this action. This is how control over the execution of the action (go/no-go decision) is exerted, and can, for example, be used to veto the action in a stage of preparation.
LP4a Generating an ownership state for B and a
If the sensory representation of (tendency for) action a in agent B has level V1 and the sensory representation of s has level V2 and the preparation for action a has level V3 and the sensory representation of e has level V4 and ownership of a for B, s and e has level V5 then after t ownership of a for B, s and e will have Note that in case that B is the agent self, the first condition in LP4a and LP4b indicates how far the agent has a certain willingness to come to an action or expression. For example, when no other agent is present the willingness to explicitly express emotions may be less, or when the agent is in a passive mood, willingness to come to an action a may be low. The use of ownership states in control of execution is modelled by LP5:
LP5a Action a execution
If ownership of a for B and s and e has level V1 and preparation for action a has level V2 and the action execution state for a has level V3 then after t the action execution state for a will have level V3
LP5b Body change b execution
If ownership of b for B and e has level V1 and preparation for body state b has level V2 and the execution state for b has level V3 then after t the execution state for b will have level V3
Note that these executions also function as the nonverbal part of the empathic response; e.g., showing a face expression with the same emotion as the other person.
Property LP6 describes in a straightforward manner how execution of action a or body change b affects the world state for effect e or body state b. 
LP6e From action execution to effect state
The following property models how sensor states are updated. It applies to an action a of agent B, a feeling b of agent B, a stimulus s, effect e, or emotion indicated by body state b (covered by variable W). 
LP7
Communication of ownership of the other agent to the other agent represents acknowledgement of an agent that it has noticed the state of the other agent: a verbal part of the empathic response. These communications depend on the ownership states as specified in LP8. 
LP8a Communication of the other agent B's intention a and e for s

Simulation Results
In this section simulation results are discussed for one of the scenarios that have been explored. Note that in this section for the sake of simplicity two agents A and B are considered and for each of s, a, e, b, just one instance is used, which is the same for both agents. In the first two scenarios mutual empathic understanding and convergence to a joint decision are achieved (for two different situations), and in the third scenario mutual empathic understanding is achieved but no convergence to a joint decision. In all of the scenarios all connection strengths were taken 1, except the inhibiting connections, which were taken -0.2, and the connection to the action effect in the world which was taken 0 as the focus here is on the process of decision making prior to the actual execution of the decision. The speed factor  was set to 0.5 and ∆t = 0.2. In the scenario shown in Fig. 2 The only difference between the two agents is that agent A has level 1 for the self-context factor which indicates willingness to come to action and for agent B this is 0.5. In Fig. 2 it is shown that triggered by the stimulus s, from time point 3 on both agents develop a preparation for action option a, which is immediately followed by activation of predicted effect e. Next, around time point 6 both agents start to develop an emotional response preparation for b on the predicted effect e, and as a consequence (by the as-if body loop) the feeling of this emotion from time point 9 on. Around time point 10 agent A starts to activate the self ownership state for action option a, whereas for agent B this only happens later, after time point 16, due to its lower self-context value. Due to this, agent A expresses (the tendency for) action option a from time point 20 on. From time point 22 on agent A expresses the emotion felt, after an ownership state for this was activated from time point 20 on. Note that at this point in time point agent B does not show such reactions, due to the lower self-context for agent B. However, by B's mirroring of the two types (action tendency and body state) of expression from agent A, agent B is affected in its preparation levels for both the action option and the bodily response. Due to this, agent B also expresses the feeling from time point 21 and the tendency for action option a from time point 26 on. This actually creates a joint decision for action option a, accompanied by a good feeling b for it. Moreover, this also provides the nonverbal part of B's empathic response on agent A's action tendency and feeling. Furthermore, agent B shows a verbal empathic response to A for both the action and the feeling starting at time points 28 and 30, respectively. The verbal empathic response from agent A comes later, at time points 32 and 33 respectively, which reflects the fact that some time was needed to get agent B in the proper state (due to mirroring) to show support for action option a and feeling b.
Discussion
In this paper a social agent model was presented based on mechanisms from Social Neuroscience. The model addresses the emergence of joint decisions, accompanied by shared emotions and mutually acknowledged empathic understanding. To this end it covers both cognitive and affective processes and their interaction in decision making, and social contagion. Core mechanisms adopted are mirror neurons (e.g., [23, 32, 35, 39] ), internal simulation (e.g., [8, 10, 16, 17, 20] ), and emotion-related valuing of predicted effects of action options (e.g., [1, 8, 9, 11, 29, 31] ). It was shown how such social agent models can be used to perform simulation and analysis of the emergence of joint decisions grounded in shared emotion-related valuing, and together with mutual empathic understanding of agents. The social agent model uses elements from the model presented in [37] for the empathic understanding, but in contrast to [37] where the empathic understanding was limited to emotions, in the current model it is applied to both (tendencies for) actions and emotions. Furthermore, the current model uses the idea of ownership states as in the model presented in [38] . However, in [38] 
